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ALIMONY REFORM
H.L. ROGERS

While Singer trenchantly attacks the faults in no-fault divorce, the alimony
system she proposes falls short. Alimony is indeed necessary but must be
based on something other than the traditional economic rationale, which
disenfranchises women and children.

I

n the article “Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the
Shoe Won’t Fit,” Jana Singer discusses the problems in the evolving
no-fault divorce laws and argues the need for alimony. However,
both no-fault divorce and the alimony system she proposes (based on
an economic rationale) are inadequate. First, I intend to show the problems with no-fault divorce as chronicled by Singer and others. Second,
I will discuss how Margaret Brinig and other feminist scholars have
found that the economic justification Singer proposes for alimony,
partly in this article and more extensively in the article “Alimony and
Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony,” is not capable of equitably awarding alimony to the
noneducated or nonprofessional spouse.
Economic justification is not capable of equity in all cases because it
falsely assumes that family specialization is always desirable. Because
economic rationale often disenfranchises women and children, many
of those adversely affected do not have marketable commodities. As a
result, they often receive less through alimony than they should. Not
only does this demonstrate why the notion of a clean financial break is
impossible, but it also provides evidence to show that alimony should
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not be seen as a hurdle to overcome in divorce, but as an equitable
means of compensating for capital lost through divorce.

No-Fault Divorce
No-fault divorce has two main purposes. The first is to exclude
fault from divorce proceedings, while the second is to enable a financial
and emotional clean break between the couple. Although the first purpose has made divorce proceedings simpler and cleaner, the second has
been shown to be nearly or completely impossible.
When no-fault divorce took effect in California in 1970, it implied
the dissolution of alimony payments. However, as both Singer and
Herma Hill Kay have discussed, the primary reason for moving to nofault divorce was to dissolve the prerequisite of fault in a divorce and to
enable a clean break in the marriage.1 Finding fault in a marriage could
be used for two purposes only: to show a no-fault basis for divorce by
establishing “irreconcilable differences” or to determine the custody of
a child produced from the marriage.2 The impact of no-fault divorce on
alimony came from its second purpose—to enable a clean break financially and emotionally. Because of the idea of “the clean financial
break,” “divorce proceedings were to sever not only the couple’s legal
union, but their economic relationship as well.”3
Eliminating fault from divorce has helped create divorce procedures that limit adversarial procedure, thus diminishing the emotional
damages that stem from sometimes lengthy and harsh litigation. The
clean break theory, however, has proved impractical in marriages that
include children.

Clean Break
Margaret Brinig has shown that the goal of achieving a clean break
through divorce in a marriage with children is impossible:
Most of the time divorce involves minor children. Whether or not
we characterize them as unwilling victims of their parents’ decision to
separate, they are affected. These effects may be temporary, as with
the emotional or relocation costs of divorce, the probable lowered
standard of living, or the immediate loss of a continued parental
contact. Children also lose over the very long-term according to a
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number of studies. Thus arguably there can be no clean break when
children are involved.4

Children need a relationship of some type even after the marriage
is over. One spouse cannot simply disappear without adverse effects.
And usually neither spouse wants to disappear.
Because a clean break is not possible in all circumstances, the
dissolution of alimony is also not possible in all circumstances. In cases
where there are children, contact between ex-spouses must continue,
and alimony is no longer a hurdle. Since the idea of a clean financial
break, alimony was seen as a hurdle to overcome. If a spouse had to
continue to pay alimony, the break could not be achieved. Thus,
“alimony, if awarded at all, was to be awarded sparingly, and only for
the short-term.”5

Alimony
In an earlier article, Singer expands on the rationale that dissolved
alimony:
The advent of no-fault divorce and the demise of the state-imposed
marriage contract significantly undermined these traditional rationales
for alimony. Because divorce no longer required a showing of fault or
breach, a damage remedy seemed inappropriate. Similarly, because
marital obligations were no longer officially gender-based, an alimony
remedy premised on the husband’s support obligation and available
only to the wife seemed both anachronistic and discriminatory.6

The reasoning behind no-fault divorce led to the dissolution of
alimony. As shown above, however, such reasoning was faulty in
marriages with children. But alimony also has other intrinsic problems
that Singer discusses. For instance, traditional husband-to-wife alimony
seems discriminatory in an era when both male and female are shown
to be equally capable in the work force. Therefore, alimony is necessary
in certain divorces, but any alimony stipulated must be reformed.
Under current theory, and according to Singer’s argument, the alimony that would be enforced now is based on an economic rationale.
In her view, economic rationale for alimony assumes that couples will
attempt to maximize their commodities in their marriage relationship.
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These commodities include not only traditional aspects such as income
and material wealth, but also things such as home-cooked meals, children, and family time. Economic rationale also theorizes that couples
will specialize in order to gain more commodities more efficiently. Marital specialization theory holds that the spouse that is more productive in
a certain sector will specialize in that sector. For example, if the female
spouse is better suited to raise and care for children, she will stay home
and care for them while the male spouse enters the work force.7 Thus,
following economic rationale, alimony would be based on the commodities lost by the dissolution of the marriage and its specialization.

Economic Rationale
Two main problems exist with approaching divorce using an economic rationale. First, this approach incorrectly assumes that marital
specialization is the most efficient means of a couple increasing their
“commodities,” meaning the overall well-being of the couple. Second,
the rationale often disenfranchises women and children because it is
difficult to gauge a commodity that has no value in an economic
market such as material compensation for time spent raising children
instead of earning a degree and entering the work force.
Specialization is not always the most efficient way to sustain the
well-being of the marriage and family. As Brinig points out, specialization is only most efficient in a marriage “that ends in due course.”8 If
the marriage ends prematurely in divorce or death, the specialized
spouse that remains with the children must learn to fill roles that he or
she knows little or nothing about. For example, if the male was the sole
economic provider and he is left to care for the children, he will have
to learn quickly about household production and child-rearing.
Conversely, if the female that raised the children and carried out
the household production is left without the sole economic provider,
she will have to quickly enter a work force for which she is not prepared. In these circumstances, it would be far more efficient for the
male to participate in some of the child-rearing and household production and for the female to participate moderately in the work force.
Thus, economic rationale is not the best model for alimony decisions,
because if the roles are shared, this model is not suited to discern where
commodities were earned in the more complex setup. Also, economic
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rationale theory fails to consider the psychological effects of a divorce
on a spouse in a relationship where the roles are completely specialized.
Another problem with economic rationale is that it often disenfranchises women and children. Joan C. Williams notes that this
rationale “not only impoverishes women, but also results in systematic
disinvestment in children.”9 Although many would like to think differently, gender roles still influence economy. As Singer states, “despite
recent attempts by some economic theorists to delink marital specialization from gender roles, the two remain closely, perhaps inextricably,
connected.”10 When specialization occurs in a marriage, the male
almost always goes into the work force while the female stays at home
to raise the children and maintain the household. Because of the dominance of these gender roles, women and children almost never have
marketable commodities. Thus, alimony is still almost always paid
from male to female. And while it is arguably easier to calculate how
much a male in the work force is worth and will be worth, it is difficult
to calculate how much the female has earned and will earn in the
household. This makes it difficult to determine how much the male
owes the female.
Because of these two problems, the economic rationale that Singer
proposes for deciding alimony needs reform. Alimony is necessary,
especially because gender roles often leave the female spouse with few
or no marketable skills. As Joan Krauskopf shows,
Every court reacted sympathetically to the inequity of one spouse
receiving no compensation for sacrifice of standard of living and personal funds in order to enable the other spouse to obtain the personal
benefit of advanced education, which significantly increased earning
capacity. A fundamental sense of fairness was repelled by the enrichment of one at the expense of the other ex-spouse when, contrary to
expectations, divorce precluded sharing the personal benefit reaped
by the educated spouse.11

Currently, courts want to award spouses that have supported the
other spouse through school and into the work place, especially if
the divorce takes place before the noneducated spouse can enjoy the
higher income that comes from additional education. Alimony is
necessary to ensure the well-being of the noneducated spouse and the
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children after the divorce. As the current attitude of the courts demonstrate, it is unfair that one spouse sacrifice his or her market value to
send the other spouse through school without receiving some type of
compensation should divorce occur.

Conclusion
Thus, alimony is necessary but difficult to award. The easiest way
to award alimony is by using the economic justification. However, this
method has been shown to be unfair. Often the most prized commodity in the marriage is not the money earned by the working spouse.
And often it is not even the care of the household by the other spouse.
As Singer states, “The most important career asset associated with
marriage is not the career enhancement itself; it is instead, the ability to
advance a career while at the same time experiencing the benefits of
parenthood.”12 Singer concludes, “This analysis implies that, for purposes of apportioning career assets, it may be appropriate to distinguish
13
between marriages that have and have not produced children.” It is
important to determine the type of marriage relationship in order to
adequately award the alimony. Differences in the law should be maintained for specialized marriages, marriages where specialization is not
total, and marriages with and without children, among others. Alimony
based on laws that differentiate between families would be more
equitable. However, although alimony remains a necessity, the law will
have to find and implement better ways of awarding it.
H.L. Rogers, a junior from Arvada, Colorado, is an English major and philosophy
minor at Brigham Young University. He would eventually like to work as an
advocate for charities in developing countries.
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